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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respndent, 
-v-
AALPH WYNFIELD FORSHEE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CASE NO. 16350 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of the defendent-
appellant, Ralph Wynfield Forshee, for the crime of Unlawful 
Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance, to wit: Marijuana, 
a Third Degree Felony, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1953) as charged 
in an Information filed in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake Couty, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellent was tried by jury before the Honorable 
Judge James S. Sawaya and found guilty of Unlawful Distribution 
for Value of a Controlled Substance, to wit: Marijuana, as charged 
~the Information on July, 17, 1978. Appellant was sentenced 
to The Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of 0-5 years 
as provided by law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
I:efendant-Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction and 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FAcrS 
The testirrony in this case in reference to a single alleged 
oc=rence concerning the sale of marijuana by the Appellant to Deputy 
Sheriff Mark Whittaker was at extrerre variance. As to this alleged 
occurrence, the prosecution produced the testirrony of only one witness, 
Deputy Whittaker. The defense offe=ed the testirrony of three witnesses, 
all of whom denied that the alleged event oc=red. 'Ihese witnesses were 
the Appellant, Vickie Forshee and Val Densley. 
a. According to the testirrony of Deputy l'lhittaker: 
Officer vlhittaker had been employed only a short tirre at the 
Salt lake County Sheriff's Office prior to the alleged sale of marijuana by 
Appellant. (Tr. 12). Officer Whittaker began w::Jrking at the County Sheriff's 
Office in January of 1978. (Tr. 24) • He did not begin w::Jrking as an under-
cover officer until three rronths later. (Tr. 12). Deputy Whittaker testified 
his duty was to rreet with infonnants who were originally introduced to him 
by other officers. Those infonnants would introduce the undercover officer 
to people allegedly "dealing narcotics". (Tr. 12). 
w11ittaker called an infonnant on April 21, 1978. Whittaker 
stated the infonnant had a=anged previous sales for him, but those arrange-
rrents had always fallen through. (Tr. 27). Whittaker rret the infonrant at 
the I:elton Bowling lanes in Granger tw::J hours after the phone conversation, 
at approximately 5:30 p.m. in order to meet sareone to purchase "narcotics'·· 
(Tr. 13). The infonnant and Whittaker traveled to a new location "just north 
of 3100 South 3450 West". (Tr. 14). At this destination, Whittaker entered 
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a residence wherein he net a man he identified at the trial as the Appellant 
(Tr. 14) Whittaker testified bt.D "little girls" were present along with 
the defendant's forrrer wife, Vickie Forshee The only other person 
present was the informant. The informant had previously given Officer 
1-hlttaker Vickie Forshee's narre (Tr. 15) and had told Officer Whittaker 
that he lived with Vickie For.shee at this residence. 
After Officer Whittaker entered the residence, Vickie Forshee 
[Xlinted to a srrall plastic bag on the kitchen table. (Tr. 16) Whittaker 
sat at the kitchen table while the others renained in the living room. 
(Tr. 35) No one else left or entered the roans. (Tr. 17) Whittaker 
"rrentioned it seerred to be kind of a srrall lJag. " According to Whittaker 
the Appellant replied it was "as good as tiestick" (Tr. 16) • 
Officer Whittaker gave the Appellant $50.00 for the bag of 
rrarijuana and the Appellant placed the m:mey in his wallet. (Tr. 17) 
Whittaker kept the marijuana in his possession tmtil giving it to Deputy 
Sheriff Randall Anderson_one hour later at Valley Fair Mall. (Tr. 19) 
The informant did not leave tl1e residence when Whittaker left because 
he lived there. (Tr. 18) Whittaker stated he returned twice to this 
residence after April 21st. The first tine was approxilrately bt.D days 
later. (Tr. 28,29) He talked to Vickie Forshee both tines attempting 
to locate the Appellant. The informant was no longer living at Vickie 
Forshee's residence the second tine vlhittaker returned. (Tr. 29) 
Whittaker testified he had not known the informant was 
a convicted felon, but he had been aware tllat the informant "had been 
in and out of jails." (Tr. 36) 
-3·-
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The testinony of Officer Whittaker was admittedly based on 
a typewritten rep::>rt of the alleged April 21st occurrence as well as 
his rrerrory. (Tr. 2 3) The typewritten rep::>rt was taken fran Officer 
Whittaker's notes ~ritten after he left Vickie Forshee's residence and 
prior to his rreeting Deputy Sheriff Anderson. (Tr. 22) The rep::>rt was 
typed that night, April 21st, at approxlirately 10:00 p.m. (Tr. 38) 
Whittaker did not examine the rep::>rt after being typed until August 22nd, 
the date of the preliminary hearing. (Tr. 23) 
b. Testinony of the Appellant Vickie Forshee and Val Densley: 
The llppellant and Val Densley testified that they had never 
seen Officer Whittaker prior to the preliminary hearing in August. (Tr. 54, 721. , 
Vickie Forshee testified she saw Whittaker for the first time at the 
pretrial conference, because she did not attend the preliminary hearing. 
(Tr. 64) The defendant did not have any specific recollection of April 
21, 1978. (Tr. 58) The l\ppellant testified he has tw:l children, one roy 
and one girl, both from his forrrer wife, Vickie Forshee. (Tr. 61) He 
admitted to having been convicted on a previous marijuana charge "over 
three years ago." (Tr. 61) 
Vickie Forshee testified she lived at 3488 BB West Lake Road 
w-ith her children from January 1 until the first of June. (Tr. 62) She 
rret Richard Garrett one week before Christmas of the previous year. ('I'r. 631 
Richard Garrett lived with her from the first of January until the first 
or middle of April 1978, when he severely beat her and she requested 
he leave. (Tr. 63, 64) 
-4·-
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The Appellant, Vickie Forshee and Val I:ensley testified to 
tbe intense jealousy and hatred felt by Richard Garrett for the Appellant. 
secause of this jealousy, the Jlppellant brought Val Densley, his girlfriend, 
with him to his forrrer wife's residence when he visited his children. (Tr. 54,65,71) 
(llly once did the Appellant not bring Val Densley with him to Vickie 
Forshee' s residence when he w=nt to visit his children. 
Richard Garrett threatened to kill the Appellant in approx:irrately 
April of 197 8 . (Tr. 54 , 55, 7 3) He atterrpted to go to the defendant's 
residence taking a 30. 06 rifle but was arrested by the Kearns police after 
Vickie Forshee informed them of Garrett's intent. (Tr. 63, 64) A police 
rep:lrt of this atterrpt was filed. 
Vickie Forshee testified she had known that Garrett had been 
ill prison until September 1977. (Tr. 66) He was arrested the following 
' y~ while he lived with Vickie Forshee during the oammission of a burglary, 
(Tr. 55, 67) Vickie Forshee did not know if Richard Garrett was an 
illforrrant for the police. (Tr. 64) Richard Garrett was released on bond 
for the burglary. Vickie Forshee stated, "He w=nt and pulled another robbery, 
stoled a car and split. They caught him in california and he's in prison 
in California right now. •· (Tr. 67) 
Counsel for Appellant was thwarted in efforts to determine if the 
alleged confidential infonnant and Richard Garrett were one and the sane. 
Counsel for Appellant repeatedly atterrpted to discover the identity 
of the confidential infonnant who supposedly "set up" the drug transaction 
and who was present for the alleged consumation of this transaction. A 
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In the M::>tion it was requested: 
1. Provide the narres of all persons present at the time of 
the alleged sale of a controlled substance •• , , . , , 
The State of utah ap~red this request without disclosing the narre of 
the said infoJ:IPaiJ.t as follows : 
1. Present at the time of the alleged sale of a controlled 
substance were, Deputy Mark Wittaker Salt lake COunty Sheriff's 
Office, Vicki Forshee, the defendant Ralph Wynfield Forshee, 
and a confidential infoJ:IPaiJ.t wrose identity will not be dis-
closed. The confidential infoJ:IPaiJ.t is not disclosed for the 
reason that he is still being utilized by other police agencies 
in undercover narcotics v.ork and to disclose his identity v.ould 
corrpranise and prejudice those investigations. Furthe:rnore, 
the entire transaction took place between Deputy Whittaker and 
the Forshee's and the confidential infoJ:IPaiJ.t was not involved 
in the transaction other than the fact that he was present. 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
Appellant also requested: 
4 . Provide the number of other arrests and alleged unlawful 
sales that the undercover officer entered into during the rronth 
of the alleged distribution by the above narred defendant. 
Responclmt through counsel answered: 
4. Question number four relates to information involving a 
confidential infoJ:IPaiJ.t, which information is not furnished as 
stated in question no. one. 
Appellant then filed a rrotion to dismiss the prosecution for 
failure to disclose the narre of the alleged confidential infoJ:IPaiJ.t, 
infonning the court that the infoJ:IPaiJ.t was believed to be Appellant's 
antagonist Richard A. Garrett. This rrotion was denied and all efforts of 
Appellant to secure the disclosure of the identity of the infonrer were 
denied by the court. (Tr.atl2-5) 
On the 11th day of January, 1979 Jlppellant filed a "Notice of 
Intent'' to use the defense of entraJ=ID2!1t. 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FAIWRE OF THE STATE TO DISCLOSE THE NAME AND WHEREABOUTS 
OF THE 50-CALLED CDNFIDENTIAL INFORMANT WAS CONSTI'IUTIONALLY 
IMPERMISSABLE AND NOI' IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 36 , UTAH RULES 
OF EVIDENCE. 
In the case at bar, Appellant requested the disclosure of the 
name and whereabouts of the so-called confidential informant who was 
present during the alleged transaction which lead to the charge in this 
case. Counsel for the State objected to such disclosure claiming a 
privilege against the disclosure of such info:rmation. Appellant sul::mi.ts 
that under both the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 36 and by Constitutional 
dictate, Roviaro V. United States, 335 U.S. 53 (1957) that the State ITR.ISt 
disclose the info:rmation sought or dismiss the Info:rmation against Appellant. 
In Roviaro, as in the instant case, the accused was charged with illegal 
drug trafficking. Roviaro was specifically charged with Distribution of 
ll2roin for Value and Importation of Heroin in a two count indictrrent (353 
U.S. 565). As in the instant case through both pretrial discovery ITOtions 
and at trial defense counsel sought the narre and whereabouts of the govern-
rrent informer who was present for the "sales" transaction which formed the 
basis of the Indictment. The Court denied all such defense efforts for 
disclosure. The United States Suprerre Court in reversing the defendant's 
conviction on both counts on Due Process grounds, held that since the informant 
was an active participant in the transactions and his testiiiDny might be 
relevant and helpful to the accused' s defense, then the prosecution was 
'Jilder a duty to disclose the narre and whereabouts of the inforrnant or 
Glsmiss the case against Roviaro. (353 U.S. at 62). 
-7-
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The Roviaro decision and the various State statutes and rules 
which embody the so-called infonrer privilege rrerely clarify and raise to 
the level of ronstitutional significance what was the Ccrmon Law Rule. 1 
The Court in Roviaro held that the Governrrent is privileged to withhold 
fran disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations 
of law to officers charged with enforcerrent of that law. The Court stated 
that the purpose of this Governrrental privilege is the furtherance and 
protection of the obligation of citizens to c:arrnunicate their knowledge 
of the cammission of crirres to law enforcerrent officers and by preserving 
2 
their anonymity, encourage them to perform that obligation. 
The Court ~t on to hold that this policy concern must of 
necessity yield on certain occasions and engrafted certain specific limit-
ations on the scope of that privilege. 
The Roviaro rule and its exceptions has subsequently becane 
enacted in Utah and other jurisdictions as a Rule of Evidentiary Privilege. 
see Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 36 (Enacted 1971) which provides in its 
entirety: 
Rule 36 . Identity of Informer 
"A witness has a privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of 
a person whc has furnished information purporting to disclose a violation 
of a provision of the laws of this State or of the United States to a 
L. See Underhill, On Criminal Evidence, (3d ed. 1898) §287 at 395-396; 
54 Gal. Jur. 2d, Witnessess, §45 at 305 and People v. Garcia, 67 Gal. 
2d 830, 64 cal. Rptr. 110, 434 P.2d 366 (1967) and Honore v. Superior Court 
70 cal. 2d 162, 74 cal. Rptr. 233, 449 P.2d 169 (1969) (Which speaks in 
terms of Federal and State Due Process violations. ) 
2. McCormick, On Evidence (12th Cleary Ed. 1972) §lll at 236 Roviaro,~._ 
United States, 353 U.S. at 59. 
-8-
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representative of the State or the United States or governrrental divison 
thereof, charged with the duty of enforcing that provision, and evidence 
thereof is inadmissible, unless the judge finds that (a) the identity of 
the person furnishing the infonnation has already been otherwise disclosed 
or (b) disclosure of his identity is essential to assure a fair deter-
mination of the issues."3 
The exceptions to the confidentiality requirement and which 
' ll!lder the utah rule and Roviaro' s dictates require disclosure are as 
follows: 
(a) The privilege does not extend to the disclosure of the 
contents of a camn.mica~on which will not tend to reveal the 
identity of an infomer; 
(b) The privilege is not ap~licable where the identity of the 
infomer has been disclosed; 
(c) Where the disclosure of an infomer's identity is relevant 
and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to 
a fair determination of the crime.6 
~Vhere any of the above situations exist, the trial court should 
c~l disclosure and, if the Governrrent withholds the infonnation per-
taining to the identity of the infonnant, the case should be dismissed. 7 
In the instant case, both the second and third lirni tations are 
applicable. 
3. The Utah Rule is based upon and identical to Unifonn Rule of Evidence, 
Rule 36. See also Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 510 (P.O.D. 1971) (a 
siJ11ilar Rule was not enacted as part of the new Federal Rules of Evidence) 
~also Section 78-24-8 (5), U.C.A. (1953) and III, Whartons Criminal Evidence 
I ll3th Torcia Ed. 1973) §580 at 116-117. 
4. Roviaro, 353 u.s. at 60 fn. 7; VIII vligrrore Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §2374 
Ill ;~ck, en Evri..dence (Cleary Ed. 1972) §lll at 238 fn. 50. 
I. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61 fn. 8; VIII vligrrore Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 
§237~ 
6. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 61 fn. 9; McConnick, en Evidence (Cleary Ed. 1972) 
mi~ fn.JSl. 
(353 U.S. at 61). Anno., 28 A.L.R. 2d 1041; Anno., l. L.Ed. 2d 1998 (1957). 
-9-
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a. THE DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMANT WAS NECESSARY TO THE DEFENSE. 
The informant not only supposedly set the "deal up" but also was 
an eyewitness to the event and within earshot of the alleged conversation. 
In dealing with this type of case, the COurt in Roviaro, said: 
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure 
is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing 
the public interest in protecting the flo.v of infonnation against 
the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper 
balance renders non-:disclosure e=neous must depend on the 
particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration 
the cr:irre charged, the possible defenses, the possible signi-
ficance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors. 
(353 u.s. at 62). 
'lhe Goverrurent in Roviaro, ho.vever, conceded the necessity of 
disclosure as to the heroin sales count, which is identical to the instant 
8 
case. And, the courts have uniformly held that disclosure is :rrandatory 
in such situations, as in the case at bar, wherein the informant is an 
9 
active and actual participant or eyewitness to the alleged offense. A 
recent case on point is People v. Goliday, 106 cal. Rptr. 113, 505 p.2d 
537 (1973) wherein the california Supreme COurt in following Roviaro held 
that failure to disclose the narre and whereabouts of a percipient eyewitness 
(confidential informant) to the defense or make a reasonably diligent effort 
to find the witness denied the defendant Due Process of Law and required 
10 
reversal of a heroin sale conviction. 
8. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 58-59. 
9. For an extensive collection of cases so holding, see III vJharton' s 
Criminal Evidence (13th Torcia Ed. 1973) §580 at 119 fn. 67.1. 
10. The courts extend the obligation of the prosecution to include dis-
closure as well as .... "reasonable steps to locate or obtain information 
about such eyewitness informants. " Eleazer v. Superior COurt, l cal. 3d 
847, 83 cal. Rptr. 586, 464 P.2d 42, 54 (1970). People v. Goliday, supra, 
505 P.2d at 542-543. 
-10-
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As the Suprerre Court stated in Roviaro: 
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege 
arises fran the fundarrental requirerrents of fairness. Where 
the disclosure of an inforrrer' s identity, or of the contents of 
his ccmnunication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an 
accused, or is essential to a fair detennination of a cause, the 
privilege must give way. In these situations, the trial court 
may require disclosure and, if the Government withholds the infor-
mation, dismiss the action •.. (353 U.S. at 60-61).11 
A well reasoned opinion as to the requirerrent of producing the 
identity of the informant appears in the case of M:lendez v. Superintendent, 
Clinton Correct. Fac., 399 F. Supp. 430, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), wherein the 
court held that to allo.v the Governrrent to conceal the identity of potential 
witnesses is in derogation of l:oth defendant's right to carpulsory process 
under the Sixth Amendrrent and the right to be furnished exculpatory evidence 
12 
under the Fifth Amendrrent. The court stated: 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. (1967) found that right so 
fundarrental that it was applicable to the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendrrent, and required the invalidation of a state 
statute, rooted in the ccmron law, providing that persons charged 
as co-participants in the sarre crirre could not testify for one 
another. As the court there put it: 
"The right to offer the testirrony of witnesses, and 
to carpel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain 
terms the right to present a defense, the right to present 
the defendant ' s version of the facts as well as the 
prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth 
lies." (338 U.S. at 19). 
ll. The court in Roviaro indicated that in circumstances such as those in 
the instant case and Roviaro the defense need only indicate that the inforrrer's 
testirrony might assist the defendant in presenting his case. (353 U.S. at 64); 
See also MCCOrmick, §lll at 238 fn. 51. Also see the california Suprerre 
Court's staterrent in People v. Goliday, supra, 505 P.2d at 543 (collecting 
cases) " ... an accused need show only a possibility that a material witness 
might testify favorably on his behalf. " 
l). Accord. United States v. Edwards, 503 F.2d 838, 840-41 (9th Cir, 1974); 
chl~ St~tes v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1439 (19th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Jones, 492 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1974); M:lawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1 
ITtllCir. 1973); People v. Musgrove, Colo., 529 P.2d 313 (1975) and State v. 
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Disclosure of the infomant na.y have assisted in AppellantS 
defense of Entraj:m8Ilt originally offe=ed in the fonn of a notice of intent 
to rely on that defense. 
M::>re importantly, ha-rever, there was a severe conflict in the 
testinony of the alleged percipient witnesses to this supposed drug trans-
action. Three witnesses called by Appellant, including Appellant himself, 
testified that the transaction alleged just did not ==. Only Deputy 
Whittaker testified that he purchased drugs fran Appellant. The Deputy's 
credibility was genuinely affected by his inability to rerrerrber certain 
surrounding events. For exarrple, the number and gender of Appellants 
children allegedly present during the transaction. 
b. THERE IS NO PRIVILEX:iE WHEN THE NAME OF THE INFORMANT IS KNCWN 
AND UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES DISCIDSURE IS REQUIRED. 
In the case at bar, disclosure was also na.ndated under the 
second prong of the Roviaro rule, ie. where the identity of the inforrrer 
13 
has been disclosed or is known. 
In the instant case, Appellant felt his antagonist Richard Garrett 
was the infomant. If in fact Garrett was the infomant, there was no 
confidentiality.remaining and disclosure should have been made when re-
quested. 
Appellant did not request disclosure solely for disclosure~ sake. 
In the instant case where the credibility and recollection of the alleged 
undercover purchase was called into severe question, then the identity and 
recollection of the eyewitness infomant was manifest to insure the truth 
finding process was not abridged by faulty recollection and half-truths. 
13. Accord. Utah Rule of Evidence, Rule 36 (b) 
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Moreover, in order to insure effective cross-examination of 
J);puty Wllttaker the narre and wherearouts of the informan~rirre !lOVer in 
the transaction was necessitated. 
The trial court allo.ved Appellant to elicit a ~alth of testi-
rrony concerning Richard Garrett and his a.nirrosity towards Appellant. The 
forced disclosure of the narre of Garrett as the informant would have allowed 
the jury to determine if in fact the case was a "set up". When the credibility 
of witnesses was the primary issue at the trial belav and disclosure of 
the ubrost necessity in allaving Appellant to effectively present his theory 
of the case . By holding back the names of the informant the defense was 
unable to effectively investigate and prepare for the cross-examination of 
~puty Whittaker. This prevents the defense fran truely testing the credibility 
and veracity of those who attack the defense case. SUch preparation has 
long been recognized as rreans of effectively discrediting testillony upon 
which a reasonable doubt might reasonably rest. 14 Experience teaches that 
effective confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses may push a case 
~yond the line where a reasonable doubt exists. 15 
14. See Wellman, The Art of Cross-Examination (1905). In fact without 
ad~te preparation cross-examination can be a dangerous ~apon which may 
"backfire on its user." II Schwartz, Proof, Persuasion and Cross-Examination 
11975) Ch. 16. Jeans, Trial Advocacy (1975) Ch. 13. and Palrrer, Courtroan 
Strategies (1959) Ch. 5 at 90-91 (Cross-Examination " .... is a t\oKJ edged 
SWOrd that may cut both ways . . . Or as Hamlet would say, you may be hoist 
with your avn petard: Cross-Examination may explode in your own face ..• ) 
15. Hence the courts are generally loath to restrict cross-examination by a 
defendant in a criminal case. Deinhardt v. State, Md., 348 A.2d 286 (1975); 
S~te v. Mason, Utah, 530 P.2d 795 (1975); State v. Warner, 79 U. 510, 12 P. 2d 
ll7 (1932); State v. Smith, 90 U. 2d 482, 62 P.2d lllO (1936); State v._ Srrelser 
234 2d 246, 463 P.2d 562, 564 (1970); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Giles 
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CONCLUSION 
In =nclusion, the case law is clear that fl.ll1darrental fairness 
eml:x:xlied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 1\nendnent to the 
United States Constitution and Article cne, Section 7 of the constitution 
of the State of utah, and the letter of utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 36 
demand disclosure of the narre and whereal:x>uts of the alleged ccnfidential 
infonrant in circumstances such as the instant case or dismissal of the 
Infonmtion. 
Article One, Section 12 of the COnstitution of the State of 
utah as well as the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendrrents to the constitution 
of the United States required effective cross-examination and ccnfrontation 
of all witnesses against the accused and carpulsory process to se=e 
attendance of p::>tentially helpful witnesses. Both of these crucial con-
stitutional rights v.ere abridged by allCMing the State of utah to hide rehind 
a false mask of =nfidentiality in the instant case. 
Wherefore, Appellant respectfully requests reversal of his ccn-
viction and the judgerrent and sentence entered thereon and remand of ~ 
case for new trial. 
Ronald J. Yengich 
Attorney for Appellant 
O'COnnell and Yengich 
Attorneys a_t Law 
44 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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MAILING CERI'IFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the fore-
going Brief of Appellant to the office of the Attorney General, 
I 236 state Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
~ day of December, 1979. 
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